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A number of philosophers argue that because of its history of sys-
tematic disagreement, philosophy has made little to no epistemic
progress – especially in comparison to the hard sciences. One ar-
gument for this conclusion contends that the best explanation for
systematic disagreement in philosophy is that at least some, po-
tentially  all,  philosophers  are unreliable.  Since we do not know
who is reliable, we have reason to conclude that we ourselves are
probably  unreliable.  Evidence  of  one’s  potential  unreliability  in
a domain purportedly defeats any first-order support one has for
any  judgments  in  that  domain.  This  paper  defends  philosophy.
First, accepting that science is rightfully treated as the benchmark
of epistemic progress, I contend that a proper conception of epis-
temic  progress  highlights  that  philosophy  and science are  rele-
vantly similar in terms of such progress. Secondly, even granting
that systematic disagreement is a mark of unreliability and that it
does characterize philosophy, this paper further argues that evi-
dence of unreliability is insufficient for meta-level, domain-wide,
defeat of philosophical judgments more generally. 
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Ряд философов утверждает, что из-за систематических раз-
ногласий  прогресс  в  философии,  особенно  в  сравнении
с естественными науками,  фактически отсутствует.  Одним
из следствий  такой  позиции  является  тезис  о  том,  что
некоторые – а возможно, и все – философы не заслужива-
ют  доверия.  Поскольку  мы  не знаем,  кому  можно  дове-
рять, мы имеем основания полагать, что мы не можем до-
верять и себе.  Свидетельство о чьей-либо потенциальной
ненадежности  якобы  дезавуирует  всякое  обоснованное
суждение. Автор этой статьи защищает философию. Во-пер-
вых,  признавая,  что  наука  по праву  считается  эталоном
эпистемического  прогресса,  автор  утверждает,  что  пра-
вильное понимание эпистемического прогресса указывает
на то, что философия и наука относительно схожи. Во-вто-
рых, автор утверждает,  что,  даже если допустить,  что си-
стематическое разногласие является признаком ненадеж-
ности и что оно действительно характеризует философию,
свидетельства ненадежности недостаточно для метауров-
ня – для дискредитации философских суждений в целом. 
Ключевые  слова: разногласие,  обоснование  высшего  порядка,
эпистемический прогресс, метафилософия
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Introduction 
There is much ado concerning the epistemic status of philosophical
judgments and philosophy’s epistemic progress in general. A troubling re-
ality a propos theoretical inquiry, of which philosophy is a paradigm do-
main, is that consensus is difficult to come by, even amongst putative ex-
perts.  This  purported  feature  of  philosophy  has  prompted  a  series  of
related theses. The first, which is notably moderate, suggests that due to
a lack of convergence on answers to its biggest questions, philosophy has
made little epistemic progress.1 Building from this conclusion, some the-
orists contend that the lack of convergence in a domain is best explained
by some, perhaps most or all, participants to that domain being epistemi-
cally  unreliable.2 Such  evidence  of  general  unreliability,  as  we  have
no means of adjudicating who is reliable, serves to defeat any first-order
evidence one has supporting their philosophical views. It follows, then,
that no philosophical judgments are justified. All philosophical judgments
are subject to defeat. 
We can characterize the above theses as progress pessimism and reli-
ability pessimism respectively.3 The former applies to the collective state
of philosophy overall. Using convergence on correct responses to our big-
gest questions as the standard, philosophy has made little to no epistemic
progress.  The  latter  applies  to  the  epistemic  condition  of  individual
philosophers,  primarily based on disagreement-based,  higher-order,  de-
feat. I am suspicious of each of these pessimistic conclusions. My goal,
then, is twofold. First, I want to pressure the collective convergence the-
sis in favour of philosophy’s epistemic progress, specifically as compared
to science, which is often offered as an epistemically progressive domain
par excellence. Secondly, I argue that even if philosophy is epistemically
inert due to a persistent lack of convergence, or systematic disagreement,
it does not follow that such disagreement defeats all philosophical judg-
ments. I consider each of these challenges in subsequent sections below. 
I. Collective Convergence as Epistemic Progress?
To begin, let us formulate an argument consistent with the progress
pessimist’s  contention that collective convergence is the mark of epis-
temic progress: 
1 See especially [Chalmers, 2015]. 
2 See especially [Goldberg, 2009, 2013a, 2013b] and [Kornblith, 2010, 2013]. 
3 As discussed below, the reliability pessimist thesis is based on what [Beebee, 2018]
refers to as the disagreement challenge. 
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PP
1. A domain D makes epistemic progress to the degree that it pro-
duces  collective convergence to  true or  correct  responses  to its
biggest questions.4 
2. Philosophy has little to no collective convergence in response to
its biggest questions. 
3. Philosophy has made little to no epistemic progress. 
Sympathizers of PP often appeal to the purported progress made in
the hard sciences to support their thesis. David Chalmers, e.g., suggests
that  epistemic  progress  is  measured  by  “collective  convergence
to the truth,” and “the benchmark [used] is comparison to the hard sci-
ences” [2015, p. 4]. Hillary Kornblith suggests likewise: “the field of phi-
losophy in general…simply does  not  have anything like the  epistemic
standing of the empirical sciences” [2010, p. 44]; philosophy’s problem is
“not that [it] has failed to yield explanations or predictions of physical
phenomena, let alone that it has failed to produce exciting technological
innovations,”  because,  of  course,  “philosophy does  not  aspire  to  such
things.” The problem, instead, is that despite philosophy’s long history
and brilliant practitioners, “we have made little if any progress in answer-
ing philosophical questions” [Kornblith, 2013, pp. 260‒261]. By contrast,
then, science is purported to have made progress in answering scientific
questions in ways that philosophy has not been able to answer philosoph-
ical questions. A notable mark of this progress is the level of agreement
amongst scientists not found amongst philosophers.5 Scientific inquiry,
then, is the paradigm and benchmark of collective epistemic progress. 
Let us consider the conception of epistemic progress as collective
convergence to truth in response to a domain’s big questions. I suggest
that this standard is stronger than progress pessimists intend, as it seems
to deny that even the hard sciences make progress on questions where
they clearly have. Consider two scientific research areas: life in evolu-
tionary biology and gravity in theoretical physics. Biologists seek expla-
nations  for  the  diversity,  complexity,  and  origins  of  life.  Theoretical
physicists seek to understand what gravity is, how it applies in different
parts of the universe, and how we might be able to answer these ques-
tions. Let us suppose that the big questions for each field concern the on-
tology and explanations of their candidate topic. They ask: What is life/
4 This  premise echoes David  Chalmers’ [2015]  measure of  epistemic  progress,  dis-
cussed below. 
5 There are many points garnering suspicion here. That consensus indicates reliability
has obvious counter examples. Consensus amongst Stalinist scientists under state in-
fluence should confer no increased epistemic confidence in the content of their agree-
ment. Further, what degree of consensus is needed for reliability? And, it’s unclear
what science is? Addressing these concerns is beyond the purpose of this paper. These
concerns and the argument to follow nevertheless seem to indicate a question-begging
account of science as the ideal for epistemic progress. 
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gravity? What explains life/gravity? If  the claim that  a domain’s epis-
temic progress is evidenced by converging judgments, or widely accepted
theories, by the majority of practitioners in response to their fields biggest
questions is accurate, then we might be concerned that evolutionary bio-
logy’s and theoretical physics’ epistemic progress are no better off than
philosophy’s.
In response to the question of what life is, “astrobiologists will tell
you honestly that this question has no simple or generally accepted an-
swer” [Tyson and Goldsmith, 2005, p. 235]. There is certainly conver-
gence on evolution by natural  selection and the role genetics play in
life’s evolution. Nevertheless, few (probably no) biologist would claim
that there is a generally accepted answer on how life began on Earth. In-
deed, there is virtual consensus that life had to have emerged in the first
third of Earth’s existence, pre-oxygen. However, even the time period at
which life emerged has a hundreds of millions, possibly a billion, year
margin of error. And this convergence says nothing of how life emerged
here.  Possibly  life  was  transplanted  from  space  dust  traveling  from
other  galaxies  or  solar-systems;  perhaps life  was sparked and dimin-
ished many time over due to cometary bombardment in Earth’s early
period; perhaps an electrical storm produced a chemical reaction spark-
ing life. Nevertheless, there is no widely accepted answer to what we
might think are some of biology’s biggest questions. We might conclude
with the progress pessimists that there has been no epistemic progress in
this branch of biology. 
Few (probably no) physicists would claim that there is an accepted
answer  to  the  question  of  gravity.  There  is  certainly  consensus  over
the success  of  Einstein’s  general  theory of  relativity  (GTR).  However,
there is also consensus that GTR is presently incompatible with quantum
mechanics, the accepted model of the subatomic. So the best theory of
gravity we have to date,  GTR, is  inconsistent  with our best  theory of
the subatomic  – which some might argue is fundamental. A number of
hypotheses seeking to account for quantum gravity that jibe with GTR
are on offer.6 None has gained anything close to consensus. The gravity
question remains unanswered. We might conclude therefore that there has
been no epistemic progress on this issue in this domain. 
Of course, the above conclusions are absurd. To say that the genetic
revolution has not progressed past basic Darwinian Theory, which was
a monumental  shift  beyond teleological  explanations  of  life,  is  simply
false; to say that GTR has not progressed past Newtonian gravity, which
itself progressed beyond Galilean gravity, is simply false. I suggest that
the  problem emerges  when convergence  is  demanded of  responses  to
a domain’s big questions. We might think that the above examples of two
6 See [Joshi, 2009], [Moffat, 2008], [Randall, 2005], and [Smolin, 2001] for general ac-
counts of this challenge.
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of the biggest questions in two of the most established hard sciences are
offside. First, because I am highlighting the empirical and theoretical lim-
its scientists face in those two fields, and secondly, because the examples
ignore the significant convergence on the models that have allowed scien-
tists to reach these limitations. If indeed these examples are offside for
these reasons, then we might wonder what is meant by biggest questions
in the context of the hard sciences. I suspect that convergence on GTR
and the genetic explanation for life’s evolution qualify as the type of con-
sensus that progress pessimists have in mind when appealing to science’s
success. If this suspicion is correct, then we might cash out convergence
in terms of theory or model acceptance.7 Notice also, however, that if this
suspicion is correct, then it becomes unclear what to do with competing,
equally plausible, paradigms, and furthermore, why we would conclude
that philosophy has not made similar progress. 
One way to address the above puzzle is to remove the biggest ques-
tions condition,  thereby reformulating  epistemic progress.8 Under such
a reformulation, epistemic progress is also demonstrated when we have
a better understanding of the target concept, its application, where further
investigation is needed, and what no longer works or is no longer needed
for one’s theory. This latter conception of progress may not produce con-
vergence on a single theory in response to our big questions, even while
there  is  convergence  on  these  additional  considerations;  it  seems  like
epistemic  progress  nevertheless.  We can  accept,  then,  that  both  wide-
spread theory acceptance and a refined understanding of the relevant is-
sues  concerning  a  target  concept  or  theory  seem to  signify  epistemic
progress and are not mutually exclusive. Acknowledging this point ac-
counts  for  why  we think  there  is  scientific  progress  on  the  problems
of life  and  gravity,  despite  the  current  lack  of  consensus  on  some
of the major points in these domains. We can also note that issues in epis-
temology, e.g., have advanced in relevantly similar ways, despite the re-
maining open, admittedly large, questions. Some examples: most epis-
temologists  accept  that  there  are  important  internal  and  external
components to knowledge; few, if any, epistemologists defend the coher-
ence theory of truth, truth tracking as a theory of justification, or the con-
textualist  account of knowledge.  While many of the questions remain,
questions as old as the debate, it is wrong to conclude that no progress
has  been  made  in  this  domain  –  just  as  it  is  wrong to  conclude  that
no epistemic progress has been made concerning gravity or life’s origins. 
7 This interpretation of convergence muddies the truth or correctness condition, but for
the sake of argument we can assume a realist thesis concerning scientific models ap-
proximating truth.
8 Chalmers  [2015:  §3]  acknowledges  that  under  various  conceptions  of  epistemic
progress, philosophy indeed has progressed.
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We might  think that  even if  progress  is  made in  more piecemeal
ways in philosophy,  that  disagreement remains ubiquitous is  a sign of
epistemic inertia.  I propose that this disagreement, if not overstated, is
at least ignoring that the philosophical scrutiny that produces disagree-
ment  often occurs  within an (or  even many)  underlying agreement(s).
A fortiori, there is significant agreement at work in the dialectic to begin
with.  The disagreement is in the details.  Here is  an example:  Political
philosophers John Rawls and Robert Nozick have very different views on
distributive justice, the role of government, and a citizen’s civic responsi-
bility.9 They have also garnered a number of defenders for their respec-
tive systems who continue to debate these issues nearly 50 years on –
we will  refer  to  these two camps as  the  Socs and Narcs  respectively.
If we were to focus solely on the differences between the Socs and Narcs,
we might conclude that their disagreement is systematic  –  indeed, they
are continuing in the millennia old debates concerning justice and cen-
turies old debates concerning the social contract. Noteworthy, however, is
the significant  agreement  between  these  two  camps.  Each  endorses
the tenets of the liberal democratic tradition, each champion the individ-
ual as a free and rational agent amongst equals, and each seeks to mini-
mize the role of government within these parameters. There is therefore
significant agreement between the Socs and Narcs and at least some evi-
dence  that  a  degree  of  convergence  has  occurred  amidst  or  prior
to the disagreements. 
One may contend that this is still a case of the type of persistent dis-
agreement characteristic of epistemic inertia. The Socs-Narcs debate con-
cerns justice, which is a debate as old as philosophy itself. So the big
questions on justice remain unanswered. There have not been any monu-
mental or ubiquitous adoptions of any one theory of justice. The progress
pessimist may contend, then, that the Socs-Narcs example actually brings
into  sharper  contrast  philosophy’s  lack  of  progress.  Nevertheless,  this
contention  fails  to  appreciate  the  significant  agreement.  So,  we  have
an example  of  a  disagreement  that  rests  on  a  broader  agreement.
At the very least, then, we can conclude that not all propositions relevant
to a theoretical domain like philosophy diverge. The democratic frame-
work accepted by the majority of political theorists today serves as an ex-
ample.10 Moreover, if agreement is a sign of progress, then we also have
an example of progress. What is more,  justice  and democracy also pro-
vide analogues to  gravity. Justice and democracy are concepts as old as
9 See [Nozick, 1974] and [Rawls, 1971].
10 Indeed, a number of theorists working within different, at times opposing, traditions
adopt the liberal-democratic framework. In the pragmatic tradition see [Dewey, 1986],
out of the Frankfurt School see [Habermas, 1992], out of the social contract tradition
see [Nussbaum, 2006], and, on some readings – [Wellmer, 2000], e.g. – in the classi-
cal tradition [Arendt, 1965] to name only a few. 
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philosophy. However, the justice at issue in the above dialectic is contex-
tualized and updated to the dynamics of the current debate. The salient
considerations, points of emphasis, and theoretical parameters are set by
the agreed upon and updated framework – viz. the tenets of contemporary
democracy. This phenomenon is again analogous to scientific agreement.
As scientists are responsive to new information and adopt new models to
address  old  problems,  so  too  do  philosophers  adopt  new models  and
modes of thinking to address old problems. It seems, then, that in impor-
tant respects philosophy is epistemically similar to science, our bench-
mark of epistemic progress. 
We also find an additional similarity between philosophy and science
when discussing those issues that lack scientific consensus, like a com-
plete theory of gravity. As science produces results on the basis of some
model, the model itself will eventually run into theoretical or empirical
limits.  It  seems that when we push a view to such limits,  we uncover
more, sometimes bigger, questions. At some point, the science-philoso-
phy  distinction  seems  to  break  down entirely.  Consider,  for  example,
work  in  the  ontology  and  direction  of  time,11 on  fundamentality  and
the wave function,12 and on biodiversity.13 There is significant overlap,
including  collaborations,  between  philosophers  and  scientists  working
on these  issues.  Given  that  the  science-philosophy  distinction  breaks
down at a specific point in scientific research, we have reason to infer
that  philosophy is  capable of making significant  contributions to epis-
temic progress in the sciences. 
In sum: This section pressures the acceptability of PP’s first premise,
specifically that collective convergence on true or correct responses to
a domain’s biggest questions is the mark of epistemic progress. Accepting
that the hard sciences are the benchmark for epistemic progress, I have
highlighted that there is perhaps less convergence on responses to the big
questions  in those domains than we think,  similar  to the lack of con-
vergence we find in philosophy. Conversely, if we reformulate a slightly
weaker conception of epistemic progress that accounts for why we justifi-
ably conclude that the hard sciences have made significant epistemic pro-
gress, it becomes less clear that philosophy doesn’t make similar progres-
sions. I am not suggesting that philosophy has made the same degree of
progress as the hard sciences.  I  am suggesting,  however,  that  the epi-
stemic benchmark provided by science is insufficient  for showing that
philosophy has made little or no epistemic progress – even on some of its
biggest questions. 
11 See, e.g., [Albert, 2000], [Carroll, 2010], and [Maudlin, 2007: Ch. 4].
12 See the various essays in [Albert and Ney, 2013].
13 See [Maclaurin and Sterelny, 2008].
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II. Systematic Disagreement as Defeater?
A second, stronger, pessimistic view is offered in response to philo-
sophy’s purported lack of convergence, framed in terms of longstanding or
systematic disagreement (hereafter SD).14 On this view, the concern isn’t
simply that philosophy hasn’t made epistemic progress in ways commen-
surate  with domains  like  the  hard sciences.  Rather,  because of  the SD
characteristic of philosophy, philosophers have few, if any, doxastically
reasonable judgments. The support for this conclusion rests on the higher-
order defeat  resulting from recognized disagreement. Sanford Goldberg
argues, e.g., that anyone working in philosophy for any length of time will
recognize that SD abounds and that in such disagreements “(there is a seri-
ous  chance that)  at  least  one of  the  disputing parties  is  unreliable  and
I don’t know that it’s not me” [2013a: 180]. All philosophers, then, have
reason to question their reliability. And if one has reason to question one’s
reliability with respect to domain D, then one has a higher-order defeater
for any judgment within D. The result, then, is a Pyrrhonian skepticism
(hereafter p-skepticism), wherein no philosophical judgments are justified
in virtue of the state of the domain itself. 
In the previous section I suggested that it might be an overstatement to
conclude that philosophy is indeed subject to ubiquitous SD. Let us sup-
pose, however, that SD does provide evidence that at least a good number
of philosophers are unreliable.15 Does it follow from the existence of this
higher-order evidence that all of one’s judgments relevant to a p-domain
are  ipso facto  unreasonable – that all of one’s relevant judgments in that
domain are defeated? I argue that the existence of SD does not imply uni-
versal defeat. For the sake of argument, let us assume a total-evidence view
of doxastic justification. On this view, one’s judgments are reasonable to
the degree that those judgments are on balance supported by and based on
one’s total evidence. What is more, on a total-evidence view we find that
SD is simply another evidential consideration amidst numerous considera-
tions. By parity, one’s consideration that SD shows that one might be unre-
liable applies equally well to others; one might be unreliable and so might
anyone else. This strikes me as evidence in favor of epistemic humility and
more suitable for fallibilist arguments than for p-skepticism.16 Further, SD
14 Sanford Goldberg [2013a] characterizes SD as non-local, widespread, and entrenched,
meaning that  the disagreement crosses a  range of  issues,  the contending positions
have gained support from members of the broader community of inquirers, and the
disagreement is not likely to end anytime soon.
15 Philosophers in addition to Goldberg who accept this contention but not necessarily
p-skepticism, include: [Beebee, 2018], [Brennan, 2010], [Christensen, 2014], [Fumer-
ton, 2010], [Kornbnlith, 2010 and 2013] and [van Ingwagen, 1996].
16 Worth noting is that fallibilism is a claim about knowledge. In its simplest form, we
can characterize fallibilism thus: S can know that  p, but might be mistaken that  p.
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does not seem to carry sufficient evidential weight to eclipse all other con-
siderations. So, while there is some evidence that one might be unreliable
given SD, it is plausible that one has additional evidential considerations
that on balance justify one’s judgments despite the potential that one is un-
reliable. To make this point, I begin with a discussion on higher-order evi-
dence in the context of peer disagreement. 
Peer Disagreement
Much of the current  p-skeptical  concerns are rooted in the recent
epistemic  cause célèbre surrounding  peer disagreement.  A motivating
question in this domain concerns rational responses to the discovery of
peer disagreement. Very roughly, the disagreement of interest concerns
epistemic peers – people who have equal  evidential  access,  epistemic
virtue, and epistemic abilities – who disagree even after full disclosure.
That is, the disagreement persists between peers even after each party to
the disagreement has an opportunity to explain her reasoning and rea-
sons for the diverging judgment. Thus the question: How should one ra-
tionally respond when one finds oneself in this situation? A popular view
motivating higher-order evidence’s potential to defeat first-order judg-
ments, and thereby related to motivations for p-skepticism, is so-called
conciliationism.17 On this view, when faced with an epistemic peer who
disagrees with oneself, one should conciliate in response. One way con-
ciliationists make this point is that upon finding oneself in a peer dis-
agreement  under  full  disclosure,  each  peer  should  suspend judgment.
If there  is  no  obvious  evidential  or  aptitudinal  asymmetry  between
the peers, then the higher-order evidence produced by the disagreement
is sufficient to defeat one’s first-order evidence. In either case the point
is that higher-order evidential considerations are sufficient defeaters for
first-order considerations.
I am sympathetic with conciliationism. Nevertheless, I contend that
there are circumstances under which one can remain reasonably steadfast
even in the face of peer disagreement. First, consider the relevant type of
disagreement we would dub unreasonable:
Or in weak logical terms: S could know that p, on the basis of non-entailing evidence.
Or in weak epistemic terms: S could know that p even though that p is not maximally
justified for S. I am not concerned here with knowledge claims, but rather doxastic
reasonability. So while I suggest that SD seems more suitable for defenses of falli-
bilism, I am not making an argument about knowledge. I am arguing that one can hold
a doxastically  reasonable  judgment  even  if  one  might  be  unreliable  or  might  be
wrong.
17 In addition to Kornblith [2010, 2013] and Goldberg [2013a], other notable concilia-
tionists include David Christensen [2007, 2009], Adam Elga [2007], Richard Feldman
[2006, 2007], Jon Mattheson [2009], and Roger White [2005]. 
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Unreasonable Peer Disagreement:  If  S1 and S2 remain steadfast  in
their  respective  opposing  judgments  over  the  correct  conclusion  to
draw from a shared body of  evidence at  time  t,  even after  they ac-
knowledge each other as peers and have fully shared their respective
reasons for their opposing judgments, then S1 and S2 are members of
an unreasonable disagreement at t.
It is important to highlight that there is no epistemic asymmetry be-
tween S1 and S2 here. Another point to note is that it is strictly in virtue
of  the  higher-order  evidence  that  S1  and  S2  would  be  unreasonably
steadfast under such circumstances. Their respective total bodies of evi-
dence – the combination of first and second-order evidence – supports
suspension of judgment. If, however, there were an epistemic asymmetry
between the two peers, then whoever was in the better epistemic situa-
tion could reasonably remain steadfast. This consideration suggests that
were S1, say, to provide additional reasons in favor of her judgment that
were not available during the initial disagreement, she could reasonably
maintain her initial judgment despite recognizing S2’s disagreement. 
The above example might  seem uninteresting.  Despite its simpli-
city, however, I suggest that it sheds light on how one might respond to
both challenges from peer and systematic disagreement. Consider a less
straightforward  example  of  unreasonable  disagreement  from  modern
physics:
Deep Reality: Albert and Niels are widely recognized, and recognize
each other, as world-leading physicists. Both have published iconoclas-
tic research that lead to the quantum revolution in physics. Both are up
to date with current research pertaining to quantum mechanics and its
implications  for  our  understanding  of  the  universe  at  a  deep  level.
There are no salient arguments or formulas that Albert has not consid-
ered that Niels has and vice versa. Indeed, they have even discussed
their disagreement in person. From this evidence, Niels concludes that
there is no deep observer-independent reality in the universe. Niels ar-
gues that his conclusion is a direct implication of quantum mechanical
mathematics and our limitations as classically confined observers. Al-
ternatively, after considering all of the same evidence, Albert responds
to Niels’s view in a research paper, showing that this view is paradoxi-
cal. What is more, both physicists agree with the mathematics and its
implications. Albert says that it leads to a paradox, so the theory cannot
be correct; Niels argues that the theory is correct, so much the worse
for our conception of reality. There are roughly the same number of ex-
perts in this field endorsing Albert’s view as there are experts endors-
ing Niels’.18
18 Nick Herbert describes the story:
Quantum theory is complete as it stands, said [Niels]... [Albert’s] strategy was to
confront [Niels] with a series of thought experiments which aimed to show that quan-
tum theory had left something out.... 
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According to conciliationism, both Niels and Albert should suspend
judgment. This conclusion seems right. It is strange, however, that two
world-leading experts could hold unreasonable judgments in their spe-
cializations. 
Contrast  the  above  circumstances  with  a  scenario  that  represents
when one might reasonably remain committed to a judgment in the face
of  disagreement.  At  the  turn  of  the  twentieth-century,  physicists  were
concerned with puzzles about light. According to their best models, light
had to travel through a medium known as ether. Just as the speed of a ball
hurled out of a moving vehicle would travel at a speed commensurate
with that vehicle’s velocity, so too, it was thought, should light travel at
a speed  commensurate  with  the  ether’s  motion.  Experiments  showed,
however, that light travels uniformly no matter the direction it is mov-
ing – against or with the Earth’s rotation on different axis, for example.
After  considering  this  problem,  Einstein  concluded  that  there  was  no
ether because time and motion are relative to a frame of reference and
that the speed of light was invariant across such frames. Einstein con-
sidered the existing evidence and physics against his judgments but could
not render them coherent until he rejected views universally accepted by
his peers.19 Upon making this move and producing his results, Einstein’s
conclusions were widely rejected by the leaders in his field. Now, experts
nearly universally accept Einstein’s theory. 
Per the concerns in Deep Reality, one might think that since partici-
pation in a peer disagreement renders one unreasonable, Einstein’s judg-
ments  were  epistemically  unreasonable  as  he was  surely cognizant  of
these disagreements.  Fortunately,  we can explain how Einstein can re-
main justified in his initial  judgments despite facing peer opposition  –
a phenomenon  that  seems  impossible  if  the  p-skeptical  argument  is
sound.  This justification results  from the evidential  support  Einstein
As the winners tell  the story, [Niels] closed each of [Albert’s] loopholes,  but
in the minds of each the debate was never settled. Long after their arguments had
ended, on the day [Niels] died, his blackboard contained a drawing of each one of
[Albert’s] thought experiments. [Niels] struggled with [Albert] until the end. 
[Albert] too never gave up. In his autobiography he expresses his final thoughts
on the quantum reality question: “I still believe in the possibility of a model of re -
ality  –  that  is,  of  a  theory  which  represents  things  themselves  and  not  merely
the probability of their occurrence” [1985: 24].
19 There a number of excellent accounts of Einstein’s process of discovery. See, e.g.,
[Carroll, 2010: Ch. 4], [Frank, 2011: Ch. 5], and especially [Norton, 2016]. Physicist
Lisa Randall’s commentary is particularly a propos: “Although by now [2005] relativ-
ity has been well tested and even gives rise to effects that need to be accounted for in
practical devices, I do find it very remarkable that anyone listened to Einstein as first.
He was completely unknown, working in a Bern patent office because he couldn’t get
a better job. From this unlikely location he proposed a theory that went against the be-
liefs of all other physicists of his time” [2005: 113‒4]. 
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acquires after considering alternatives to his view and uncovering new
evidence  in  its  favor.  After  publishing  his  results  concerning  STR at
time t1,  I suggest  that  prior  to  anyone challenging his  view,  Einstein’s
judgments are reasonable. When at  t2 a recognized peer challenged Ein-
stein’s conclusion and Einstein knew of the reasons behind this challenge,
Einstein would have a higher-order defeater against his judgments.20 If,
however, at t3 Einstein offers additional evidence in favor of his view, or
reasons why the alternative view is mistaken, or how the criticism has
misunderstood its target, then he would defeat the defeaters, as it were.
Einstein  could  thereby remain  reasonably  steadfast  in  maintaining  his
judgment given his evidence at t3.  If at t4 a peer were to offer additional
reasons against Einstein’s conclusions, and Einstein could not provide ad-
ditional support without bootstrapping his original evidence he could not
reasonably maintain his  initial  judgment until  such time that  he could
provide novel evidence.21 Failing such responses, however, Einstein can
remain reasonably steadfast with the contested judgment.
It is important to highlight that one’s justification in response to an
opposing judgment may be short lived. The interval between  t1 and  t2,
e.g., could be quite short. Also worth noting is that during the intervals
between discovering direct challenges to one’s initial judgment and being
able to provide an epistemically satisfactory response to those challenges,
one should suspend judgment. Suppose, e.g., that there is a lengthy inter-
val between t2 and t3, during which Einstein neither suspended judgment
nor  offered any novel  reasons for  his  view or  against  the  challenges.
In this  circumstance,  he  would  be  unreasonably  steadfast.  Conversely,
there will also be circumstances where Einstein requires no substantial
time to refute a putative peer’s challenge and no suspension of judgment
necessary. Upon considering Einstein’s conclusions about STR, for exam-
ple, Einstein’s contemporaries were required to consider a new paradigm
that Einstein grappled with for nearly a decade. Misunderstandings would
be  common under  such  circumstances.  Einstein  could  swiftly  dismiss
challenges based on these types of misunderstandings without epistemic
fault. We find, then, that in remaining adaptive to the evidence as it is
presented, one will at times be required to suspend judgment but at other
times will have means to reasonably maintain the initial judgment when
in a peer disagreement.22 
20 Einstein surely found himself in such a position. Henri Poincare, for example, rejected
Einstein’s interpretation of spacetime and dismissal of ether despite himself helping to
advance the special theory of relativity. 
21 We might suggest that a certain level of bootstrapping is permissible if  the boots-
trapping highlights a nuance to one’s evidence missed by one’s peer. 
22 The preceding section borrows substantially from [Olson, 2018: Ch. 4], where I provide
a more thorough argument for a quasi-conciliatory response to peer disagreement. 
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Remaining Reasonably Steadfast Despite SD
Let us now connect the foregoing discussion concerning peer disagree-
ment to our target concern, the potential defeat emerging from SD. If the
above account for reasonable steadfastness is correct, then it seems that
when faced with a peer disagreement under full disclosure, one has two op-
tions: suspend judgment or provide additional reasons/evidence in light of
the shared extant  reasons between one’s peers  and oneself.  One of  the
problems with p-skepticism is that it nullifies the epistemic significance of
this type of reasoning process, even though it seems equally as applicable
to SD as it does to peer disagreement. Consider, for example, Bert’s rea-
soning process concerning the traditional analysis of knowledge [TAK]:23 
TAK holds that for one to know one must have a justified true belief.
But think about a trustworthy clock that one has used for years. One
could see this clock 12 hours after it stopped working and accurately
judge the  time on that basis. It doesn’t seem as though one would know
the time under such circumstances, however. So it seems like there is
good reason to conclude that  justified  true belief  is  insufficient  for
knowledge even though most of my peers accept this account.24 
Suppose that Bert is the first person to notice this flaw in TAK. Upon
this discovery, then, there are no strong counterarguments to his position.
It appears as though Bert’s reasons on balance support judgment.
The p-skeptical position seems to imply that even if one were able to
provide novel arguments in light of new or extant evidence, as Bert has,
one’s  judgment  would  remain  unreasonable  nonetheless.  In  virtue  of
the argument occurring within a p-domain, one’s judgments are unreason-
able given the higher-order evidence of unreliability. Bert should there-
fore include the following in his considerations: 
Despite what seems to me a reasonable conclusion, I recognize that
epistemology is subject to SD; so, I might be unreliable on this issue.
It  therefore would be unreasonable for me to hold this judgment. 
23 This reasoning is analogous to Einstein’s in the previous section, adjusted mutatis mu-
tandis for a domain subject to SD.
24 This example is from [Russell, 1948, pp. 139‒40] and is thus an anticipation of the fa-
mous Gettier problems. Russell anticipated such problems much earlier: [Russell, 1912,
pp. 76‒7]. It is noteworthy that contemporary epistemologists accept that Gettier prob-
lems create significant trouble for TAK – a notable exception here is [Bonjour, 2010] –
and that Russell was, as far as I know, the first to bring real attention to this issue. More-
over,  per above,  I  think that this provides a counterexample to SD as representative
of philosophy for two reasons.  First  is  the aforementioned acceptance of the Gettier
problems by epistemologists, which seems much as the convergence denied as applying
to p-domains. Secondly, novel arguments are insufficient for reasonable judgments in do-
mains with SD. We discuss this second point more detail in what follows. 
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According  to  the  p-skeptics,  this  is  the  only  reasonable  response
available in the face of SD. Is Bert’s total evidence indeed inconclusive
though? 
We have just noted one way that higher-order evidence can serve as
defeating evidence in the context of a peer disagreement. If one discovers
that one’s peer has considered all of the same evidence, alternative judg-
ments and reasons for them, and forms an alternative judgment, then one
has defeating evidence against one’s initial judgment. The p-skeptics adopt
similar reasoning in support of the claim that SD provides defeating evi-
dence. In this context, philosophers working on these issues are generally
epistemic peers;  at  least  some philosophers,  perhaps many or most,  are
equally as intelligent, informed, and reliable in their specific sub-domains.
Thus, according to the p-skeptic, we can infer that SD is a generalized form
of peer disagreement, with the evidential significance that brings with it.
If the appeal to one-to-one peer disagreement is apt, then there is reason to
conclude that Bert’s evidence is indeed inconclusive. 
The above comparison may not be apt in the relevant ways, however.
One minor point, a propos the comparison between peer and systematic
disagreement, concerns full disclosure. Unlike one-to-one peer disagree-
ment, SD is “entrenched, non-local, and persistent,” from which we are to
infer that at least some participants to the domain are unreliable. Gold-
berg: “to have evidence that the dispute in which one is engaged is a sys-
tematic disagreement is already to have evidence that puts rational pres-
sure on one to call into question one’s own reliability” [2013a: 177‒8].
Conversely, in a peer disagreement, in the relevant sense of an unreason-
able peer disagreement discussed above, there is full disclosure. That is,
one has considered all of a peer’s reasons and reasoning. This strikes me
as an important distinction. The evidential weight purported to show that
one and one’s peers are unreliable in SD has little to do with the first-or-
der reasons. The force of the higher-order evidence in a  peer disagree-
ment is that the participants have considered all of the same relevant evi-
dence and their reasons for their judgments. Under such circumstances, if
one cannot offer additional evidence that one’s peer has misinterpreted
the evidence,  or  missed some salient  piece of  evidence,  or  committed
a fallacy, then the evidence does indeed seem inconclusive. This is the
case in Deep Reality. It is not the case with Bert or Einstein. That SD
does not require full disclosure is a significant evidential omission that
diminishes the force of the higher-order evidence in SD. 
That SD does not mandate full disclosure is a minor point.25 A re-
lated  and more  substantial  issue  for  the  p-skeptical  contention  is  that
Bert’s reasons are defeated simply in light of SD. Consider again the p-
skeptical addendum to Bert’s reasoning from above: 
25 One might think that theorists working in a field for a sufficient length of time will be
familiar enough with the issues that their epistemic situation is virtually equivalent to
what it would be under full disclosure. 
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Despite what seems to me a reasonable conclusion, I recognize that
epistemology is subject to SD; so, I might be unreliable on this issue. 
I propose, rather than concluding that evidence of potential unreli-
ability implies universal defeat, the more reasonable implication of SD in
philosophy is that evidence of potential unreliability implies the potential
for error. Acknowledging the potential for error seems like responsible
epistemic  practice  and is  much weaker  than  outright  defeat.  Consider
how we might amend Bert’s reasoning. Rather than suspending judgment,
Bert might reason thus: 
Despite what seems to me a reasonable conclusion, I  recognize that
epistemology is subject to SD; so, I might be unreliable on this issue.
Granted, I have no reason to conclude that I am uniquely unreliable –
perhaps we all are. So I might be unreliable, but so too might those who
disagree with me. What is clear is that I seem to have good reason to
conclude that TAK is insufficient.  Given my potential  unreliability it
would be infelicitous for me to be dogmatic about this judgment. Never-
theless, without counterarguments or counterevidence against my rea-
soning, it is not infelicitous or unreasonable to maintain this judgment.
There are two related points here. First, at the time of Bert’s judg-
ment, Bert is proposing a novel argument. It  is unclear how p-skeptics
would deal with this type of phenomena. Secondly, even accepting that
SD provides evidence for one’s unreliability, Bert’s judgment remains rea-
sonable  given  his  total  evidence,  including  the higher-order  evidence
from SD.
Let us consider the first point. It is stipulated that at the time of Bert’s
considerations, there is, as of yet, no clear SD surrounding the Gettier prob-
lem and our conception of knowledge in light of this problem. With hind-
sight, we can also note that Gettier problems, with very few exceptions, are
accepted by most expert epistemologists as bonafide challenges to TAK.
We have a case, then, where a judgment in a p-domain [a domain fraught
with SD] sheds new evidence on an old question. What is more, this evi-
dence is widely accepted by more theorists working in this domain than
not. It is unclear, however, how p-skeptics could accept this as a reasonable
judgment given its  membership in a p-domain.  This is  a strange result.
It suggests that even a judgment that has evidential support and as of yet no
counterevidence can be deemed unreasonable simply in virtue of the do-
main. There would thus be no way to work towards forming reasonable
judgments within a p-domain. If the p-skeptic allows judgments to become
more reasonable – gain more evidential support – through converging judg-
ments, then it seems that not all judgments in p-domains are unreasonable.
Novel arguments and evidence have the potential to garner convergence,
rendering a judgment reasonable by the p-skeptics own lights. The strange,
I suggest incorrect, implication here is that those theorists who accept this
judgment must initially do so unreasonably. Of course, we do not contend
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that  Einstein was unreasonable  in remaining steadfast  in his  judgments
concerning STR. Bert likewise does not seem unreasonable in holding his
judgment concerning TAK.
The second point to note from Bert’s amended reasoning is that it ac-
cepts  the  p-skeptical  contention  that  SD is  evidence  for  unreliability.
Even accepting this contention, however, we at best have an argument for
epistemic humility. Included in Bert’s total evidence is that he and his
peer’s might be unreliable. This evidence is certainly grounds for epis-
temic humility (it  could also support  a  fallibilist  conception of know-
ledge). That the evidence motivates a quasi-conciliationism and serves to
support the contention that we might be wrong or unreliable on a number
of judgments, however, does not preclude that any, and most certainly not
all, judgments in that domain are defeated. There are no grounds, there-
fore, to conclude that all p-domain judgments are  ipso facto  unreason-
able. 
III. Conclusion
I have attempted to pressure two pessimistic views concerning phi-
losophy’s  epistemic progress.  I  refer  to  defenders  of  the  first  view as
progress pessimists. These pessimists appeal to the purported failure of
philosophy to match science’s benchmark epistemic progress as reason to
doubt philosophy’s progress. I response to this challenge, I suggest that
there is relevant overlap between these two domains, such that philoso-
phy shares a number of positive epistemic credentials with science, and
that science is plagued by a number of similar limitations that philosophy
has. Defenders of the second and stronger pessimistic view, p-skeptics,
hold that systematic disagreement provides evidence of a general unrelia-
bility amongst philosophers. This higher-order evidence purportedly de-
feats our first-order judgments. Appealing to available rational responses
to higher-order defeat in peer disagreement, I propose that similar rational
responses are available to philosophers faced with higher-order evidence
of potential unreliability. Such evidence surely suggests a robust accep-
tance of epistemic humility. If I am right, however, it does not suggest
that philosophers or philosophy itself cannot make rational progress.26
26 For their helpful discussions or comments on various parts of this paper, I would like
to thank Charles Bakker, Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, members of my Metaphiloso-
phy in 20th Century Analytic Philosophy Winter 2018 seminar at McMaster Univer-
sity, and audience members at the Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of
Science 2018 annual meeting. 
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